Abstract: In this paper, we investigate a class of time-inconsistent discrete-time stochastic linearquadratic optimal control problems, whose time-consistent solutions consist of an open-loop equilibrium control and a linear feedback equilibrium strategy. The open-loop equilibrium control is defined for a given initial pair, while the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is defined for all the initial pairs. Maximum-principle-type necessary and sufficient conditions containing stationary and convexity are derived for the existence of these two time-consistent solutions, respectively. Furthermore, for the case where the system matrices are independent of the initial time, we show that the existence of the openloop equilibrium control for a given initial pair is equivalent to the solvability of a set of nonsymmetric generalized difference Riccati equations and a set of linear difference equations. Moreover, the existence of linear feedback equilibrium strategy is equivalent to the solvability of another set of symmetric generalized difference Riccati equations.
Introduction
Consider the following discrete-time dynamic system
where T = {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} with N being a positive integer, and T t = {t, · · · , N − 1} for t ∈ T. In (1.1), {X k , k ∈ T t } and {u k , k ∈ T t } with T t = {t, t + 1, · · · , N } are the state process and the control process, respectively; and {w k , k ∈ T t } is a stochastic disturbance process. Introduce the following cost functional associated with (1.1)
However, the time consistency of optimal control fails quite often in many situations. To see this, let us look at a simple example. Example 1.1. Consider a stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ, for short) optimal control with an one-dimensional controlled system X k+1 = (X k + u k ) + X k w k , X t = x ∈ R, t = 0, k ∈ {t, ..., 3} (1.4) and the cost functional J(t, x; u) = For such a new LQ problem (with the initial pair (1,X 0,x 1 )), its optimal control is given by
with 0,x on {1, 2, 3} is not the optimal control for the initial pair (1,X 0,x 1 ) as it is different from (1.7). Such a phenomenon is referred as the time inconsistency. Both e −δ(k−t) and 1 1+(k−t) in the cost functionals (1.2) and (1.5) are called the time-discounting functions. The term time discounting is broadly used "to encompass any reason for caring less about a future consequence, including factors that diminish the expected utility generated by a future consequence" [10] . e −δ(k−t) is referred as the constant discounting or exponential discounting, and δ is termed as the discounting rate. As exponential function has the property of group, i.e., e −δ(k−t) = e −δ(k−τ ) e −δ(τ −t) , intertemporal decision optimization problems with exponential discounting, including Problem (C), are time-consistent. Such kind of decision optimization problems is extensively studied in the communities of economics, finance, and control, etc.
Functions like 1 1+(k−t) are of hyperbolic discounting, which is well documented and often used to describe the situations with declining discounting rate. As the hyperbolic discounting function loses the property of group, the dynamic optimization problem is time-inconsistent in the sense that Bellman's principle of optimality no longer holds. In the survey paper [10] , several types of experimental evidences are presented to show the reasonableness of hyperbolic discounting other than exponential discounting; a particular example is that people always prefer the smaller-sooner reward to the larger-later reward. Furthermore, quasi-geometric discounting, mean variance utility and endogenous habit formation are several other representative examples [5, 15] that will ruin the time consistency.
Introduce the system X k+1 = f (t, k, x, X k , u k , w k ), X t = x ∈ R n , k ∈ T t , t ∈ T (1. 8) and the cost functional J(t, x; u) = N −1 k=t E L(t, k, x, X k , u k ) + E h(t, x, X N ) .
(1.9)
Consider the following optimal control problem.
Problem (N). For (1.8), (1.9) and the initial pair (t, x) ∈ T × R n , find aū ∈ U[t, N − 1] such that J(t, x;ū) = inf u∈U [t,N −1]
J(t, x; u),
where U[t, N − 1] is a set of admissible controls.
Different from (1.1) and (1.2), the initial time t enters explicitly into (1.8) and (1.9) . This means the controlled system and the cost functional are modified at different initial times. Furthermore, the cost functional (1.9) can also be viewed as the general discounting, which includes the hyperbolic discounting, exponential discounting and quasi-geometric discounting as special cases. Therefore, Problem (N) is time-inconsistent, in general.
Due to the time inconsistency, there are two different ways to handle Problem (N). The first one is the static formulation or pre-commitment formulation. If the initial strategy is kept all the way from the initial time, then the strategy can be implemented as planned. This approach neglects the time inconsistency, and the optimal control is optimal only when viewed at the initial time. Differently, another approach addresses the time inconsistency in a dynamic manner. Instead of seeking an "optimal control", some kinds of equilibrium solutions are dealt with. This is mainly motivated by practical applications in economics and finance, and has recently attracted considerable interest and efforts.
The explicit formulation of time inconsistency was initiated by Strotz [22] in 1955, whereas its qualitative analysis can be traced back to the work of Smith [21] . In the discrete-time case, Strotz's idea is to tackle the time inconsistency by a lead-follower game with hierarchical structure. Particularly, controls at different time points were viewed as different selves (players), and every self integrated the policies of his successor into his own decision. By a backward procedure, the equilibrium policy (if exists) was obtained. Inspired by Strotz and intending to tackling practical problems in economics and finance, lots of works were concerned with time inconsistency of dynamic systems described by ordinary difference or differential equations; see, for example, [8, 9, 11, 15, 16, 18] and references therein. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Ekeland [8, 9 ], Strotz's equilibrium policy typically fails to exist and is hard to prove the existence. Thus, it is of great importance to develop a general theory on time-inconsistent optimal control. This, on the one hand, can enrich the optimal control theory, and on the other hand, can provide instructive methodology to push the solvability of practical problems. Recently, this topic has attracted considerable attention from the theoretic control community; see, for example, [5, 13, 14, 24, 26, 28, 29] and references therein.
Concerned with the time-inconsistent LQ problems, we study two kinds of time-consistent equilibrium solutions, which are the open-loop equilibrium control and the closed-loop equilibrium strategy. The separate investigations of such two formulations are due to the fact that in the dynamic game theory, open-loop control distinguishes significantly from closed-loop strategy [3, 4, 23, 30] . To compare, open-loop formulation is to find an open-loop equilibrium "control", while the "strategy" is the object of closed-loop formulation. By a strategy, we mean a decision rule that a controller uses to select a control action based on the available information set. Mathematically, a strategy is a mapping or operator on the information set. When substituting the available information into a strategy, the open-loop value or open-loop realization of this strategy is obtained. Furthermore, an open-loop equilibrium control is corresponding to a given initial pair, whereas the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is defined for all the initial pairs. For more about the terms of open-loop, closed-loop, control and strategy, we refer the readers to, for example, the monograph [3] .
Strotz's equilibrium solution [22] is essentially a closed-loop equilibrium strategy, which is further elaborately developed by Yong to the LQ optimal control [26, 29] as well as the nonlinear optimal control [28, 27] . In contrast, open-loop equilibrium control is extensively studied by Hu-Jin-Zhou [13, 14] and Yong [29] . In particular, the closed-loop formulation can be viewed as the extension of Bellman's dynamic programming, and the corresponding equilibrium strategy (if exists) is derived by a backward procedure [26, 27, 28, 29] . Differently, the open-loop equilibrium control is characterized via the maximum-principle-like methodology [13, 14] .
Though the time-inconsistent optimal control has gained considerable attention, its theory is far from being mature. Concerned with the LQ problems, general necessary and sufficient conditions still do not include the existence of time-consistent equilibrium control/strategy. Hence, more elaborate efforts should be paid on such topic, and more insightful results are much desirable. In this paper, a general discrete-time time-inconsistent stochastic LQ optimal control is investigated, and no definiteness constraint is posed on the state and control weighting matrices. Such indefinite setting provides a maximal capacity to model and deal with LQ-type problems, whose study will generalize existing results to some extent. For more about standard (time-consistent) indefinite LQ problems, readers are referred to [1, 2, 7] . Under this general condition, this paper intends obtaining some neat results on the existence of time-consistent equilibrium control/strategy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the open-loop time-consistent equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) for a given initial pair is introduced, whose existence is characterized by some maximum-principle-type conditions. The existence of an open-loop equilibrium control for any given initial pair is then shown to be equivalent to the solvability of a set of nonsymmetric generalized difference Riccati equations (GDREs, for short) and a set of linear difference equations (LDEs, for short). In Section 3, the linear feedback time-consistent equilibrium strategy is investigated, which is defined for all the initial pairs. By also a maximum-principle-like methodology, a set of symmetric GDREs is introduced to characterized the existence of linear feedback time-consistent equilibrium strategy. Sections 4 presents some comparisons between the open-loop equilibrium control and the linear feedback equilibrium strategy. Section 5 gives several examples, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Open-loop time-consistent equilibrium control
Consider the following controlled stochastic difference equation (S∆E, for short)
and {u k , k ∈ T t } u are the state process and the control process, respectively. In (2.1), the initial time t in these matrices and the state is to emphasize the property that the matrices and the state may change according to t. The noise {w k , k ∈ T} is assumed to be a martingale difference sequence defined on a probability space (Ω, F , P ) with
Here, E[ · |F k ] is the conditional mathematical expectation with respect to F k = σ{x 0 , w l , l = 0, 1, · · · , k} and F −1 is understood as {∅, Ω}. The cost functional associated with system (2.1) is
where Q t,k , R t,k , k ∈ T t and G t are deterministic symmetric matrices of appropriate dimensions. Different from [13] [26] [28] [29], we do not pose any definiteness constraint on the state and the control weight matrices. Let L 2 F (T t ; H) be a set of H-valued processes such that for any its element ν = {ν k , k ∈ T t } ν k is F k−1 -measurable and
is a set of H-valued random variables such that any its element ξ is F k−1 -measurable and E|ξ| 2 < ∞. Throughout this paper, (t, x) is called an admissible initial time-state pair or simply an initial pair for (2.1) if t ∈ T and x ∈ L 2 F (t; R n ). Consider the following time-inconsistent stochastic LQ problem. 
Problem (LQ
In this section, we investigate the open-loop equilibrium control, whose definition below is a discretetime version of [13] .
is called an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) for the initial pair (t, x), if the following inequality holds for any k
Here, u t,x, * | T k and u t,x, * | T k+1 are the restrictions of u t,x, * on T k and T k+1 , respectively, and X t,x, * is given by ). Furthermore, (2.5) is a local optimality condition, as the control
Remark 2.3. To understand the so-called "equilibrium" in Definition 2.1, we introduce a game, termed as Problem (HG), with a hierarchical structure. The cost functional of Player
, u k is the action of Player k, and {X k ℓ , ℓ ∈T k } X k is the internal state of Player k driven by all the actions {u ℓ , ℓ ∈ T t }. Indeed, {u t , · · · , u k−1 } enters into X k via its initial state
is essentially a functional of {u t , · · · , u k−1 }. This is why we denote
indicates a forward hierarchical structure of Problem (HG): Player k − 1 could be viewed as the leader of Player k. From (2.3), (2.5) and (2.7), we have
t,x, * is the Nash equilibrium of Problem (HG). Hence, in Definition 2.1, we call u t,x, * the equilibrium control.
The following theorem is concerned with the existence of open-loop equilibrium control. (ii) There exists a control u t,x, * such that for any k ∈ T t , the following forward-backward stochastic difference equations (FBS∆E, for short) has a solution (
with the stationary condition
and the convexity condition
Here, Y k is given by
and X t,x, * is given in (2.6).
Proof. See Appendix A.
To proceed, we now recall the pseudo-inverse of a matrix. By [19] , for a given matrix M ∈ R n×m , there exists a unique matrix in 
where Y is a matrix with appropriate size.
From (2.10) and Lemma 2.5, an open-loop equilibrium control is given by
Substituting (2.14) into (2.9), we get a set of FBS∆Es
To get a more convenient form of the open-loop equilibrium control, we should decouple (2.15) to obtain some Riccati-like equations. However, (2.15) is not a single FBS∆E but a set of FBS∆Es coupled with the open-loop equilibrium state X t,x, * . To this end, we will focus on a specific case where the system equation is
Different from (2.1), the system matrices in (2.16) are assumed to be independent of the initial time t. The following result is on the equivalent characterization of the existence of open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) corresponding to (2.16) and (2.3).
Theorem 2.6. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) For any initial pair (t, x) ∈ T × R n , there exists an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) corresponding to (2.16), (2.3) and the initial pair (t, x).
(ii) The set of GDREs
and the set of LDEs
has a solution ( X k , Z k ), as the backward state Z k does not appear in the forward S∆E. Comparing the forward S∆E of (2.24) (by substituting u t,x ) with (2.23), we have
To apply Theorem 2.4, we validate the stationary condition. Noting
The last equality follows from the solvability of (2.17). Therefore, the stationary condition holds. Furthermore, corresponding to (2.12) and (2.16), let
Then, by some simple calculations, we have for
where the inequality is from the solvability of (2.18). Therefore, the convexity condition holds. By Theorem 2.4, the pair (
is an open-loop equilibrium pair of Problem (LQ) for (2.16), (2.3) and (t, x).
(i)⇒(ii). For any given initial pair (t, x) ∈ T × R n , let (X t,x, * , u t,x, * ) be an open-loop equilibrium pair of Problem (LQ) corresponding to (2.16) and (2.3). In this case, for any k ∈ T t , (2.9) (2.10)
Letting t = N − 1, we have from (2.27) and (2.28) 29) where
can be taken arbitrarily, we have from Lemma 2.5 30) and
Assume that we have derived the GDREs over the time period
is solvable. To prove the solvability of the GDREs over T t , it is necessary to prove that the GDRE associated with t
is solvable. Let x ∈ R n and consider Problem (LQ) corresponding to (2.16), (2.3) and the initial pair (t, x). Similarly to (2.29), we have for
which together with the solvability of (2.31) implies
Furthermore, from (2.27) and (2.28) we have
By the solvability of (2.31) and Lemma 2.5, we have
(2.36)
Furthermore,
and
To extend (2.39) to the case of including k = t, we have from (2.27) and (2.28) and u t,x, * t
By (2.40), the GDRE (2.32) associated with t is solvable. Thus, GDREs over T t are solvable. By the method of induction, we have the solvability of the set of GDREs (2.17).
To conclude the proof, we need to show the solvability of (2.18). From (2.11) and similar to (2.26), we have
Hence,
and (2.18) is solvable.
Remark 2.7. In (2.17), the GDREs are coupled via {W † k,k H k,k , k ∈ T}. As for k = t H k,k is generally not equal to H t,k , P t,k , k ∈ T t , t ∈ T, are nonsymmetric. On the contrary, the LDEs in (2.18) are decoupled. Hence, S t,k , k ∈ T t , t ∈ T, are all symmetric as G t , t ∈ T, are symmetric. Interestingly, there is no definite constraint on matrices associated with (2.17), while the definite constraint is posed through (2.18) . This is different from the standard indefinite stochastic LQ optimal control. Concerned with the reasons, the definite constraints in (2.18) are equivalent to the convexity conditions, while the constraints in (2.17) are associated with the stationary conditions.
Let us further assume that G t and Q t,k (k ∈ T t ) are all independent of t. Then, (2.17) and (2.18)
In this case, P k , k ∈ T, are all symmetric. Review the standard GDRE [ 
(2.43) Though the GDRE (2.41) and the LDE (2.42) are different from the GDRE (2.43), we claim that (2.41) and (2.42) are both solvable for the case with Q k ≥ 0, G ≥ 0 and R k,k ≥ 0, k ∈ T. However, the condition that ensure the solvability of (2.17) is hard to obtain (even for the definite case) due to its nonsymmetric structure. At the present time, we therefore need to validate the solvability of (2.17) case by case. In the future, we shall study the condition that ensure the solvability of (2.17), and focus on more general cases other than the case of (2.16).
Linear feedback time-consistent equilibrium strategy
In this section, we investigate a kind of closed-loop equilibrium solution, which focuses on the timeconsistency of the strategy. Here, a strategy means a decision rule that a controller uses to select her control action, based on available information set. Mathematically, a strategy is a measurable mapping on the information set. When we substitute the available information into a strategy, the open-loop realization or open-loop value of this strategy is obtained.
Here, X t,x, * = {X
From Definition 3.1, we know that Φ| Tt (the restriction of Φ on T t ) is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy. Hence, Φ is time-consistent. The following theorem is concerned with the existence of linear feedback equilibrium strategy, which is parallel to Theorem 2.4. (ii) There exists a Φ = {Φ 0 , · · · , Φ N −1 } with Φ t ∈ R m×n , t ∈ T, such that for any initial pair (t, x) ∈ T × R n and k ∈ T t , the following FBS∆E has a solution (
with the stationary condition 6) and the convexity condition
In (3.5) (3.7), X t,x, * , Y k,ū k ,Φ are given by (3.2) and
Based on Theorem 3.2, the relationship between the existence of linear feedback equilibrium strategy and the solvability of a set of difference equations is established. It is stated in the following theorem. (ii) The following set of equations
is solvable in the sense that the constrained conditions W t,t W † t,t H t,t − H t,t = 0 and W t,t ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T, are satisfied. Here, 
Proof. (i)⇒(ii)
. Let Φ be a linear feedback equilibrium strategy. Then, for any initial pair (t, x), (3.5) admits a solution. Let k = t in (3.5) and (3.6); noting Z t,Φ N = G t X t,Φ N and by results in [17] , one can get
where P t,k , k ∈ T t , are deterministic matrices and determined below. Then, from (3.6) and Lemma 2.5, we have
As x = X t,Φ t can be arbitrarily selected, we have 0 = R t,t Φ t + B T t,t P t,t+1 (A t,t + B t,t Φ t ) + D T t,t P t,t+1 (C t,t + D t,t Φ t ). From Lemma 2.5, it follows that Φ t = − W † t,t H t,t , and
Then, (3.11) holds. Furthermore, by the convexity condition (3.7), we have for
When t ranges from N − 1 to 0, we have the solvability of (3.9).
(ii)⇒(i). Note that Φ = {Φ 0 , ..., Φ N −1 } with Φ t = − W † t,t H t,t , t ∈ T. As (3.9) is solvable, FBS∆E (3.5) is solvable with property (3.11). Furthermore, by reversing some presentations in "(i)⇒(ii)", the stationary condition (3.6) and the convexity condition (3.7) are both satisfied. Therefore, Φ is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy.
Substituting Φ into (3.9), one get
For any t ∈ T, k ∈ T t , P t,k is symmetric. Furthermore, if Q t,k ≥ 0, R t,k > 0, G t ≥ 0, k ∈ T t , t ∈ T, then we can prove that W t,k > 0 and P t,k ≥ 0, k ∈ T t , t ∈ T. Therefore, (3.12) is solvable.
t ∈ T, then Problem (LQ) admits a unique linear feedback equilibrium strategy Φ.
For the case where A t,k , B t,k , C t,k , D t,k , Q t,k , k ∈ T t , G t , are all independent of t, (3.12) reads as
where
Here, (3.13) is different from (2.41) and (2.42), which relates to the open-loop equilibrium control of the corresponding situation. Moreover, when all the system matrices in the dynamics and cost functional are independent of the initial time, (3.12) will reduce to the standard GDRE [1] .
Comparison
For the time-inconsistent stochastic LQ problem, open-loop and closed-loop time-consistent solutions are separately investigated in the above two sections. Section 2 is concerned with the open-loop equilibrium control, while the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is studied in Section 3 that is a kind of closed-loop strategy. As noted in Introduction, the objects of study in these two formulations are quite different. Open-loop time-consistent solution is to find an open-loop control that is an equilibrium of a leader-follower game with hierarchical structure. Open-loop control, or simply control, or more exactly control action, in this paper is referred to as a function of time that is also adapted to a filtration; such a meaning of open-loop control is adopted by many scholars in their works (for example, [3] [23] ). Generated by some primitive random variables, the filtration is viewed as the "state of nature", and the adaptedness to such a filtration is to emphasize that the underlining open-loop control is allowed to be random. Note that the key point of above comment is not to the attribute "open-loop" but to the subject "control".
So far, time-consistent (linear feedback) strategy is the object of closed-loop formulation. A strategy is a decision rule that a controller uses to select his control action based on the available information set. Mathematically, strategy is a mapping or operator on some information set, which is a higher-rank notion other than control. When substituting the available information into a strategy, the open-loop value or open-loop realization of this strategy is then obtained. To get more about this, let us look at the strategy Φ in the definition of linear feedback equilibrium strategy, which can be viewed as a binary mapping Φ(·, ·). When substituting the information (k, X t,x, * k ), we have the open-loop value Φ(k, X t,x, * k
; (u k , u t,x, * | T k+1 )) of (2.5) satisfies the following equations
In (4.1), u t,x, * | T k+1 is not influenced by u k , because it is given prior. On the contrary, in the definition of linear feedback equilibrium strategy, the control (ΦX k,u k ,Φ )| T k+1 in (3.4) is influenced by u k via the term X k,u k ,Φ . This makes an essential difference between the open-loop equilibrium control and the linear feedback equilibrium strategy. In addition, an open-loop equilibrium control when being mentioned is corresponding to a fixed initial pair, while the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is required to define for all the initial pairs.
Moreover, the existence of open-loop equilibrium control and linear feedback equilibrium strategy is differently characterized. The fact that there exists an open-loop equilibrium control for any given initial pair, is fully characterized via the solvability of a set of nonsymmetric GDREs and the solvability of a set of LDEs. In contrast, the existence of linear feedback equilibrium strategy is shown to be equivalent to the solvability of a single set of GDREs, which are symmetric. Note that just R k,k , k ∈ T, are involved in (2.17) and (2.18). Hence, if some R t,k , k ∈ T t+1 , t ∈ T, are modified, the existence of open-loop equilibrium control will not change! The reason of this lies in the definition of open-loop equilibrium control. Specifically, given initial pair (t, x) and by subtracting
from both sides of (2.5), (2.5) can be equivalently rewritten as
where X k,u t,x, * and X k,u k ,u t,x, * are given, respectively, by
and (4.1). Note that R k,ℓ , ℓ ∈ T k+1 , k ∈ T, do not appear in (4.2). This could explain why only R k,k , k ∈ T, are involved in (2.17) and (2.18) . Otherwise, in the definition of linear feedback equilibrium strategy, (ΦX k,Φ )| T k+1 and (ΦX k,u k ,Φ )| T k+1 of (3.1) are different as X k,Φ differs from X k,u k ,Φ . Therefore, terms in (3.1) associated with R k,ℓ , ℓ ∈ T k+1 , cannot be removed, which implies the dependence of (3.12) on R k,ℓ , ℓ ∈ T k+1 , k ∈ T.
Furthermore, let us pay attention to the computations of these two equilibria. As noted above, when we mention an open-loop equilibrium control, the initial pair which induces that open-loop equilibrium control should be mentioned simultaneously. Differently, the linear feedback equilibrium strategy is independent of all the initial pairs. These facts will help us to differentiate the backward procedures (mentioned below) of computing an open-loop equilibrium control and the linear feedback equilibrium strategy. Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 3.2 are generally the maximum-principle-type equivalent characterizations, and the backward S∆Es are involved. To obtain an open-loop equilibrium control u t,x, * , we should decouple the FBS∆Es (for every k we have a (2.9)) along the equilibrium state X t,x, * . Roughly speaking, from the stationary condition, we have u t,x, * N −1 by decoupling FBS∆E (2.9) (with k = N − 1). Generally, based on all the expressions of u t,x, * ℓ , ℓ ∈ T k+1 , we should redecouple the FBS∆E (2.9) on the whole time period T k to obtain the linear relation between Z k, * and X k, * , and then by the stationary condition we can get u t,x, * k . Note that via its forward initial state X t,x, * k , the FBS∆Es are coupled with the equilibrium state X t,x, * , and the equilibrium control and the equilibrium state are obtained simultaneously.
Concerned with the linear feedback equilibrium strategy, if exists, it can be calculated via solving the GDREs (3.12) backwardly. For every generic time point t, we need to solve a single GDRE (associated with t) over the whole time period T t , and use the solution P t,t+1 at time point t + 1 to construct Φ t = W † t,t H t,t . This backward procedure is also due to a decoupling procedure of FBS∆Es (3.5). It should be mention that only under the condition of the existence of linear feedback equilibrium strategy, this strategy can be computed backwardly as above. Furthermore, necessary and sufficient conditions on the existence of the equilibria are the main concerns of this paper, from which the computations of the equilibria are much direct.
To end this section, we give the following final comment. Under the condition that there exists an open-loop equilibrium control for any given initial pair, all the open-loop equilibrium controls happen to be of feedback form; while the feedback gain .20) is not a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ) indeed!
Examples
In this section, we shall present three examples to illustrate the theory derived above. Here, 
On the other hand, from (3.13) we can obtain the solution. However, we have Clearly, W 1,1 is indefinite, and thus, the corresponding (3.13) is not solvable. This means that the linear feedback equilibrium strategy does not exist.
Example 5.2. The system matrices and the weight matrices are the same as those of Example 5.1 except for R 0,1 , R 0,2 , R 1,2 , which are now 
Note that R 0,0 is indefinite and R 0,1 is negative definite.
By (3.12), we have 
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the open-loop equilibrium control and the linear feedback equilibrium strategy of the time-inconsistent indefinite stochastic LQ optimal control. Necessary and sufficient conditions are presented for these two cases, respectively. Furthermore, the GDREs and LDEs are introduced to characterize the linear feedback form of the open-loop equilibrium control and the linear feedback equilibrium strategy. For future researches, we would like to study the time-inconsistent problems for jump parameter systems [6] , Boolean networks [12] , multi-agent systems [20] etc., and extend the methodology developed in this paper to other types of time-inconsistency.
Here, we call Problem (LQ) k a non-standard optimal control problem as u t,x, * |T k+1 in the dynamics of X k is fixed, and we just select u k to minimizeJ(k, X t,x, * k ; u k ).
To proceed, we introduce an inner product on L 2 F (T k ; R p ) with p = n, m, and k ∈ T t :
and use the convention
For L 2 F (k; R p ) with p = n, m, and k ∈ T t , the inner product is defined as
Then, the cost functionalJ (k, X t,x, * k ; u k ) can be rewritten as
We now calculate the first order and second order directional derivatives ofJ(k, X t,x, * k ; u k ) at u t,x, * k . Corresponding to controls u t,x, * | T k and (u t,x, * k + λū k , u t,x, * | T k+1 ), the solutions of (2.8) with the initial state X t,x, * k are, respectively, denoted by X k, * and X k,λ . Then, we have
Hence, we have the first order directional derivative ofJ(k, X t,x, * k
Similarly, the second order directional derivative with the direction (ū k ,û k ) is given by
Note that the righthand side of (6.6) is independent of u t,x, * k
Furthermore, we can show thatJ(k, X t,x, * k ; u k ) is infinitely differentiable with respect to u k in the sense that the directional derivatives of all orders exist. By classical results on convex analysis [8] , we have the following result.
Lemma 6.1. The following statements are equivalent.
(ii) The following holds
Proof of Theorem 2.4. (i)⇒(ii). Let u t,x, * be an open-loop equilibrium control of Problem (LQ) for the initial pair (t, x). SinceJ(k, X t,x, * k ; u k ) is infinitely differentiable with respect to u k and (6.7) is independent of u k , the minimum point u t,x, * k ofJ(k, X t,x, * k ; u k ) is fully characterized via the first and second order derivatives, namely, dJ(k, X t,x, * k ; u t,x, * k ;ū k ) = 0 and d
. Following Lemma 6.1, (2.11) holds. The forward S∆E of X k, * is clearly solvable as Z k, * does not appear in this S∆E. After obtaining X k, * and substituting X k, * into the backward S∆E, we then have Z k, * . This means that the FBS∆E (2.9) admits a solution (X k, * , Z k, * ). Furthermore, by (6.5), one can get
F (k; R m ) and the FBS∆E (2.9) is solvable, the stationary condition (2.10) follows.
(ii)⇒(i). Note that (6.8), (2.9) and (2.10), we have
which together with (2.11) implies that u
. Thus, (6.1), equivalently (2.5), holds for k ∈ T t . This proves the conclusion.
B. Proof of Theorem 3.2
As (3.1) holds for any u k ∈ L 2 F (k; R m ), in Definition 3.1 (3.1) can be equivalently replaced by
Hence, (6.9) reads as J(k, X t,x, * k ; 0| T k ) ≤ J k, X t,x, * k ; u k , 0| T k+1 , (6.11) where 0| T k is understood as u| T k = {u k , · · · , u N −1 } with u ℓ = 0, ℓ ∈ T k , and similar meaning holds for 0| T k+1 . Therefore, if Φ is a linear feedback equilibrium strategy of Problem (LQ), then 0| T will be an open-loop equilibrium control of the time-inconsistent stochastic LQ problem corresponding to (2.1) and (6.10). The cost functional (6.10) is differen from (2.3), as in (6.10) crossing terms between X k ℓ and u ℓ appear. The following is to mimic the proof of Theorem 2.4.
For any given Φ = {Φ 0 , · · · , Φ N −1 } with Φ t ∈ R m×n , t ∈ T, denote above J k, X t,x, * k ; (u k , 0| T k+1 ) and J(k, X t,x, * k ; 0| T k ) by J k, X t,x, * k ; u k and J(k, X t,x, * k ; 0), respectively. We now calculate the first two orders directional derivatives of J k, X t,x, * k ; u k . Note that
and J k, X t,x, * k
where Q k , R k+ are similarly defined as those in (6.2), and , which is independent of u k and λ. Then,
(6.12)
For any ℓ ∈ T k , we have ; u k + λū k − J k, X t,x, * k 14) and for anyû k ∈ L ; u k + βû k ;ū k − J k, X t,x, * k
Ifû k =ū k , then we have 
F (k; R m ) can be taken arbitrarily, we can get (3.6). (3.7) follows from (6.15) and (6.16).
(ii)⇒(i). Reversing the procedure of the above proof, we can achieve the conclusion. The proof is also similar to that of Theorem 2.4.
